The indirect utility function is the maximum utility buyer  can obtain by purchasing    0 and then trading optimally with firm −. We must distinguish between two cases. If the buyer prefers not to buy from firm −, his indirect utility function is simply ( ) = ( 0 ) Notice that this can never exceed (0 ) if  ≤  * (  ). If instead the buyer purchases a positive quantity of good −, his indirect utility function is
For future reference, we notice that
In other words, at   =  * (  ) and  =  , the buyer is exactly indifferent between purchasing  * (  ) of good − and not purchasing good − at all. Clearly, then, any buyer    would strictly prefer not to buy product −. In other words, 
. This means that no buyer    would purchase a positive quantity of product
In maximizing its profits, firm  can therefore proceed as if the buyer had the utility function ( ) and a type-dependent reservation utility (0 ). This maximization problem can be stated as follows:
We can restate this optimal control problem using () as our control variable and
as the corresponding state variable. The problem then becomes to maximize
As in the proofs of Proposition 2 and 3, we simply guess the solution and use sufficiency arguments to show that we have guessed correctly. Our guess now is Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987 p. 317) implies that a sufficient condition for this to be a maximum is that there exists a continuous and piecewise differentiable function
Integrating by parts and normalizing ( max ) to zero, we get
Now consider the following function ():
everywhere. By setting () =(), we can rewrite L as L = A + B + C, where:
To prove that our guess is correct, we must show that (i )
, it is immediate to verify that the derivative of the term inside square brackets with respect to  vanishes at
It is immediate to verify that the derivative of the term inside square brackets with respect to  vanishes at
(iii ) By definition, the non-linear pricing equilibrium quantities  * () and the associated equilibrium schedule  * () maximize a firm's profit given the pricing strategy of its rival in the non-linear pricing game without shopping costs. That is, they solve the problem
is the indirect utility function in the non-linear pricing game without shopping costs. Once again, we can restate this optimal control problem using  () as our state variable and () as the corresponding control variable. Using these variables, the firm's objective becomes to maximize Martimort and Stole (2009) , this latter constraint is never binding and so can be neglected. Integrating by parts the objective becomes
By construction,  * () maximizes this function. In fact, since
must pointwise maximizes any function
This implies that  * () pointwise maximizes C with respect to (). 
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2, except that the preference for variety is now effectively  ( ) − . This implies that for sufficiently low types there is no preference for variety to be extracted, and hence both exclusive and non-exclusive prices must vanish. ¥
